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Abstract: The impact of crop insurance on changes in inputs use has attracted much atten-
tion by economists. While there are a number of studies on this topic, they frame moral
hazard in inputs use in a static model. However, when agricultural producers are forward-
looking, they would make input allocation decisions realizing that their decisions would
affect their future Actual Production History. This, in turn, affects the probability and size
of future indemnity payments. Thus, moral hazard should be framed in a dynamic input use
decision model. We first show theoretically that under certain feasible conditions, a static
analysis always results in a lower optimal input use when compared to a dynamic one with
endogenous Actual Production History. This is because static models fail to recognize the
role of Actual Production History. Then, we run numerical simulations using nitrogen ap-
plication rates as a case study. We find that static models indicate significant reduction in
nitrogen use compared to the no-insurance scenario, whereas the dynamic models with a
role for Actual Production History indicate almost no reduction in applied nitrogen. The
dynamic analysis not only suggests an almost absence of moral hazard, but, for low cov-
erage rate, it results in an optimal nitrogen rate higher than that under the no-insurance
scenario. These findings illustrate the importance of recognizing the role of Actual Pro-
duction History in mitigating moral hazard possibilities in crop insurance and the dynamic
nature of moral hazard in crop insurance.
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Since its inception, the federal crop insurance program has become one of the most com-
monly adopted risk management tools for agricultural producers (Glauber, 2004, 2013).
Under this program, agricultural producers purchase federal crop insurance to mitigate rev-
enue risk.1 In general, by protecting against risk, insurance has the potential to alter deci-
sions, resulting in an increased exposure to risk; such changes in decisions are referred to as
moral hazard.2 In the context of the federal crop insurance program, moral hazard refers to
changes in producers’ decisions that result in more risk given the protection against revenue
risk that the program provides.
While many authors have studied the allocation and welfare effects of moral hazard in-
troduced by federal crop insurance (Atwood, Robison-Cox, and Shaik, 2006; Vercammen
and van Kooten, 1994; Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stan-
ton, 1993; Babcock and Hennessy, 1996; Smith and Goodwin, 1996; Coble et al., 1997;
Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue, 2006; Schoengold, Ding, and Headlee, 2014), this article
contributes to the body of knowledge by examining the changes in input use induced by
crop insurance when the revenue guarantee is a function of historical yields-Actual Produc-
tion History (APH). This innovation introduces a dynamic element to the decision-making
process that farmers consider when determining input use. Specifically, in the short-run,
since insurance reduces downside risk, producers may have an incentive to reduce an input
that reduces yield and yield risk because crop insurance acts as a substitute. However, since
APH influences the revenue guarantee, in the long-run, if current yields are reduced due
to reduced inputs, future APH will decrease, causing lower insurance revenue guarantees.
This decrease tempers the producers’ inclination to reduce current yields. Therefore, an
evaluation of the impacts of crop insurance on input use should be framed under a dynamic
input use model that captures the impact of current input use on future earnings through
APH. We show that when APH is a function of historical yields, this endogeneity affects
the degree of the potential moral hazard and the direction of change in input use.
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The effect of moral hazard in input use under crop insurance has been examined in a
variety of contexts, using a variety of methods. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) evaluated
the relationship between crop insurance and input use via a cross-sectional farm-level sur-
vey. They found that insurance purchasers used significantly more nitrogen, pesticides, and
insecticides per acre. Smith and Goodwin (1996) found from survey data that wheat pro-
ducers who purchased insurance used fewer chemicals. Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton
(1993) used data from the 1988 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and found that insured
producers tend to use fewer inputs. Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue (2006), concerned with
the identification strategies in Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) and Smith and Goodwin
(1996), used administrative data to compare crop yields before and after insurance adop-
tion. They found some moral hazard in Texas for wheat and soybeans but little moral
hazard in Iowa and North Dakota. These past studies are all empirical examinations of
moral hazard in input use and do not explicitly consider the role of APH on moral hazard.
Furthermore, while Coble et al. (1997) considered the role of APH when examining moral
hazard on indemnities, their focus was not on input use. This paper fills such a gap.
A few studies attempted to gain insights into moral hazard in input use using theoretical
models and numerical analyses. Babcock and Hennessy (1996), via numerical simulation,
predicted minor reductions in nitrogen rates at coverage rates up to 70%, and somewhat
greater reductions in nitrogen rates at higher coverage rates. However, they used a static
model where APH was set exogenously. Horowitz and Lichtenberg (1993) and Quiggin,
Karagiannis, and Stanton (1993) as well as Chambers (1989) used a static framework. The
only study that took into account the role of APH in a dynamic context is Vercammen and
van Kooten (1994). They found that under yield protection, a steady state solution might
contain “moral hazard cycles,” where moral hazard is practiced in one year and excessive
inputs are used in the following year to rebuild APH. However, the authors present a nu-
merical illustrative analysis with no particular inputs in mind and point out that their study
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has little to say about moral hazard in practice. Furthermore, they only consider a yield
protection plan rather than a revenue insurance plan, which dominates the market today
with 89% of insured corn acres (USDA-RMA, 2018).
This article builds upon the Babcock and Hennessy (1996) model by extending their
static model to a dynamic one that accounts for APH endogeneity in modeling the im-
pact of crop insurance on input use. This article considers three types of crop insurance
types-yield protection (YP), revenue protection with harvest price exclusion (RP-HPE),
and revenue protection (RP)-and for each insurance type, we consider a 70%, 85%, and
90% coverage rate.3 We first show theoretically that under certain feasible conditions and
for all the crop insurance types considered, a static analysis always results in a lower opti-
mal input use when compared to a dynamic model with endogenous APH. This difference
manifests because static models fail to recognize the value of an input in building APH for
future crop years. The input allocation resulting from a static approach is equivalent to the
end-period allocation in a dynamic model, given that todays decisions are inconsequential
in terms of future APH.
Then, for the three types of crop insurance types identified above, we run numerical
simulations using a production function estimated in Babcock and Hennessy (1996) to
compare how the degree of moral hazard changes when past input allocations affect APH.
Our numerical results indicate that the amount of applied nitrogen (input) can substantially
differ between the static and dynamic models. For example, when comparing insurance
versus no-insurance scenarios for high coverage rates, and specific combinations of insur-
ance and utility types, a static analysis suggests no applied nitrogen at all, whereas the
dynamic solution indicates almost no reduction in applied nitrogen. In general, the static
analysis suggests a reduced optimal amount of nitrogen rate relative to the no-insurance
scenario. The dynamic model not only suggests almost an absence of moral hazard, but it
indicates an optimal nitrogen rate that is higher than that under the no-insurance scenario
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for coverage rates of 70% and lower for all insurance and utility types. Our results indicate
that the endogeneity of APH offsets the incentive for moral hazard in input use. These find-
ings illustrate the importance of recognizing the impact of current input choice on future
income as well as the need to frame the moral hazard due to crop insurance as a dynamic,
repeated problem.
APH and Its Role in Crop Insurance
This section contains a brief description of the role of APH in the crop insurance program
and introduces some useful concepts and definitions. The rate yield is the simple average
of actual historical yields in the yield database, which represents a minimum of four and
a maximum of ten years of historical yields. If fewer than four actual yields are provided,
county transitional yields (T-yields) are used to stand in for the missing years. APH will
be identical to the rate yield if there are no modifications via the use of yield endorse-
ments (e.g., yield substitutions). For our analysis, we assume that APH and rate yields are
equivalent and use them interchangeably in the remainder of the manuscript.
The Role of APH in Indemnity Payment
Holding everything else constant, as APH goes up, guaranteed yield (or revenue) also in-
creases, which in turn increases the size and probability of indemnity payments. However,
the effects of APH on the size and probability of indemnity payments differ by the type of
crop insurance (YP,RP-HPE,RP).
Under YP, the indemnity payment is:
I{APH · τ≥ y} · pp · (APH · τ− y)(1)
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where pp represents the projected price (calculated per RMA rules), y is the realized yield,
and τ is the coverage rate chosen by the producer. I{·} is the index function that takes a
value of 1 if the statement in brackets is true, and 0 otherwise. If the realized yield (y)
is less than the guaranteed yield (APH · τ), the result triggers an indemnity payment of
pp · (APH · τ− y). An illustration of this indemnity activation appears in figure 1, which
shows that the indemnity payment is triggered only in areas A and B, wherein the realized
yield is lower than the guaranteed yield.
Under RP−HPE, the indemnity payment is:
I{pp ·APH · τ≥ hp · y} · (pp ·APH · τ−hp · y)(2)
where hp is the harvest price calculated per RMA rules.4 Figure 1 portrays the difference
between theYP and RP-HPE crop insurance types. In Area B, an indemnity payment is not
triggered under RP-HPE because revenue generated from the higher harvest price offsets
the lower realized yield. This results in revenue greater than the revenue guarantee of
pp ·APH ·τ. Under YP, the harvest price plays no role in determining whether an indemnity
payment is triggered or not, and an indemnity payment is triggered in Area B because
the realized yield is less than the yield guarantee. In Area C, an indemnity payment is
triggered under RP-HPE because revenue from the low realized harvest price multiplied
by the higher realized yield is less than the revenue guarantee (pp ·APH ·τ). Therefore, RP-
HPE’s relative advantage over YP resides in the fact that producers are protected against
low-price events. Inversely, YP can be more advantageous than RP-HPE when yields are
low, and the harvest price is high.
Under RP, the greater value between the harvest price and the projected price is used to
calculate the revenue guarantee. Consequently, the indemnity payment under RP is:
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I{max{pp,hp} ·APH · τ≥ hp · y} · (max{pp,hp} ·APH · τ−hp · y)(3)
When the revenue calculated based on hp (hp · y) falls short of the revenue guarantee
(max{pp,hp} ·APH · τ), an indemnity payment of max{pp,hp} ·APH · τ− hp · y will be
triggered. As illustrated in figure 1, RP triggers an indemnity in regions A, B, and C. When
compared to YP, RP expands the possibility of an indemnity payment by adding Area C.
In AreaC, the revenue from a higher yield multiplied by a low harvest price is less than the
guaranteed revenue, so the policy pays an indemnity.
The Role of APH in Premium Rate and Payment
The premium paid by a producer may be broken down into three parts for the purpose of
understanding the influence of APH:
Premium = Liability×Premium Rate× (1−Subsidy)(4)
Liability is calculated by pp ·APH · τ and is the same across the three crop insurance types
analyzed in this article. As APH increases, the liability also increases. The subsidy rate
depends on the coverage rate chosen by the producer as shown in table 1.
Unlike the liability, the premium rate differs by crop insurance type to reflect the ex-
pected indemnity payments. The premium rate calculation corresponds to numerous factors
and is much more complex than that of the liability. Since the focus of this article is on the
role of APH, the following way of writing the premium rate is sufficient:
premium rate= f (
rate yield
re f erence yield
,D)(5)
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where re f erence yield represents the expected county yield, and D embodies all other fac-
tors influencing premium rates.5 The ratio of rate yield to re f erence yield measures how
much better the producer is relative to the average producer in the same county. As APH
goes up, the ratio goes down, which in turn results in lower premium rates. Figure 2
presents an example of how premium rates change as APH changes by crop insurance type
and coverage rate, calculated for rainfed corn production for Sioux County, Iowa in 2016.6
This figure illustrates how APH influences the premium rate by insurance type.
An increase in APH simultaneously raises the liability but decreases the premium rate.
Thus, in theory, whether the premium payment goes up as APH goes up depends on the
relative magnitude of the changes in the liability and the premium rate associated with a
change in APH. Figure 3 shows how APH affects the premium amount for each YP, RP-
HPE and RP under various coverage rates. The figure shows that a higher APH leads to a
higher premium payment.
Modeling Input Use under Crop Insurance: Static vs. Dy-
namic Models
In this section, we model the input-use decision under YP, RP-HPE and RP for both static
and dynamic models. We then show that the use of static models is likely to result in
misleading conclusions about input use under crop insurance. Further, we show that under
likely conditions, static input-use modeling often underestimates the optimal input use.
The static modeling approach assumes that producers maximize their expected utility of
the concurrent production season. Denoting the input of interest by x, the producer would
solve the following problem under YP:
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Yield Protection (YPs):
maxx
∫ ∫ ∫ [
U
(
p · y+ I[APH · τ> y] · pp · (APH · τ− y)(6)
−λYP(APH)−w · x−Cother
)]
f (y, p,hp|x)dy ·dp ·dhp
This is the problem Babcock and Hennessy (1996) considered, setting nitrogen as x. U(·) is
the utility function; p represents the price at which the producer sells the crop; x represents
the input use; λYP is the producer’s paid premium; w is the input price; Cother represents
all the other production costs. The first term (p · y) represents revenue from physical grain
sales. The second term is the indemnity payment that is triggered when APH · τ > y. The
producer makes a payment of w · x for the input and Cother for all the other costs. The ex-
pected value of the utility function is obtained by integrating over y, p, and hp for their joint
distribution conditional on x, denoted as f (y, p,hp|x). The choice of input (x) influences
the joint distribution, which in turn affects the expected size and probability of indemnity
payment. Note that hp has no role under YP. Indeed, the expectation can be taken over
just y and p for their joint distribution, ignoring hp. However, it is still correct to take ex-
pectation over y, p, and hp because they will be identical. We introduce f (y, p,hp|x) here
because we need it for both RP-HPE and RP. Using a common joint distribution function
notation across all the insurance types helps us save unnecessary text and mathematical
expressions later. Further, for the sake of brevity, we use
∫
3
for
∫ ∫ ∫
integrals and dz for
dy ·dp ·dhp hereafter.
Profit maximization problems under RP-HPE and RP have basically the same structure
as the problem under YP except that they differ in the condition under which an indemnity
payment is triggered and the amount of indemnity payment.
Revenue Protection with Harvest Price Exclusion (RP−HPEs):
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maxx
∫
3
[
U
(
p · y+ I[pp ·APH · τ≥ hp · y] · (pp ·APH · τ−hp · y)(7)
−λRP−HPE(APH)−w · x−Cother
)]
f (y, p,hp|x)dz
Revenue Protection (RPs):
maxx
∫
3
[
U
(
p · y+ I[max{pp,hp} ·APH · τ≥ hp · y] · (max{pp,hp} ·APH · τ−hp · y)
(8)
−λRP(APH)−w · x−Cother
)]
f (y, p,hp|x)dz
The revenue protection considered in Babcock and Hennessy (1996) corresponds to RP−
HPE, not RP. RP dominates the market today–with 89% of insured corn acres (USDA-
RMA, 2018).
In these static models, premium rates and the other costs (Cother) do not influence the
input-use decision, as they are independent of the concurrent choice about input use. Con-
sequently, static formulations of YPs, RPs, and RP−HPEs fail to take into account the
influence of the input-use decision on future APH. The input-use decision is inherently dy-
namic because the choice of input use in the current period influences yield, which in turn
influences APH for the next ten times the particular crop/practice is grown in that unit.
Now, we let RIt (APHt) denote the profit before input cost is subtracted in the static
model under insurance type I. For example, under YP, RYPt (APHt) = pt · yt + I[APHt · τ>
yt ] · ppt · (APHt · τ− yt)− λYP(APHt)−Cother. Then, the dynamic optimization problem
under insurance type I is written as follows:
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max{x1,...,xT }
T
∑
t=1
∫
3
[
U
(
RIt (APHt)−w · xt
)]
f (y, p,hp|xt)dz
(1+ γ)t−1
+SV (APHT )(9)
s.t. APHt+1 = (
9
∑
i=1
yt−i+ yt)/10
where γ is the producer’s subjective discount rate. APH updates based on the state equation
APHt+1 = (
9
∑
i=1
yt−i+yt)/10; APH in the next period is the simple average of yields over the
past 10 years. By changing the amount of input use, the calculation changes the distribution
of each year’s yield, which in turn affects future APH. SV (APHT ) is the terminal value of
the land–specifically, the price at which the producer can sell the land after the final year of
production season before retirement.7 SV (APHT ) is modeled as a function of APH–among
other things–because APH may signal the productivity of the land, which allows us to
model producers’ incentive to maintain high APH so the land can be sold at a higher price
in the last period.
This model lets V It (APHt) denote the value function under insurance type I at time t.
Then, for t = {1, . . . ,T − 1}, the Bellman equation for the dynamic optimization model
becomes:
V It (APHt) = maxxt
∫
3
[
U
(
RIt (APHt)−w · xt
)]
f (y, p,hp|xt)dz(10)
+(1+ γ)−1 ·
∫
[V It+1(APHt+1)]h(y|xt)dy
Unlike the static models, input use (x) not only affects expected profit in the current year
(t), but also APH in the next year (t + 1), which in turn affects the effectiveness of crop
insurance in reducing risk in future periods.
Comparing the first order conditions (FOC) for the static and dynamic cases further
clarifies this point. First, in the static case, taking the derivative of the objective function
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with respect to xt , the FOC at t for t = {1, . . . ,T −1} is
∫
3
U(RI(APHt)−w · xt) · f ′(y, p,hp|xt)dz−w ·
∫
3
∂U(pi)
∂pi
· f (y, p,hp|xt)dz = 0(11)
where pi = RI(APHt)−w · xt . We let µ(x) denote the left-hand side of the above equation,
which is the concurrent marginal expected utility with respect to x. As long as µ(x)> 0 and
µ(x)< 0, the solution to the above first-order condition satisfies the second-order condition.
In the dynamic case, the FOC is
∫
3
U(RI(APHt)−w · xt) · f ′(y, p|xt)dz+
∫
Vt+1(APHt+1)h′(y|xt)dy
−w ·
∫
3
∂U(pi)
∂pi
· f (y, p|xt)dz = 0(12)
In the static case, the marginal revenue of the input simply equates to the marginal cost
of the input (w). In the dynamic case, w equals the marginal revenue of the input plus the
cumulative marginal profit of the input that will be earned in the future. Because the in-
demnity and premium rates are both functions of APH, ignoring the impact of current input
use on future APHs leads to an erroneous optimal input use. As a result, static models are
likely to under-predict the optimal input use.
Theorem:
For any period in t = 1, . . . ,T −1, the static problem would always underestimate the opti-
mal nitrogen rate when compared to the dynamic problem ∀I = {YP,RP−HPE,RP} at a
given level of APH under the following conditions (see Appendix A in the on-line supple-
mentary appendix for the proof):
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1. Condition 1:
(13)

µ(x)> 0, if 0≤ x< x∗s
µ(x) = 0, if x= x∗s
µ(x)< 0, if x> x∗s
2. Condition 2: For xa < xb ≤ x˜
P[y> α|xa]< P[y> α|xb](14)
3. Condition 3: For APHa < APHb and x∗(APHa) (the optimal input level that maxi-
mizes the concurrent expected utility when APH = APHa),
∫
3
[
U
(
RI(APHa)−w · x∗(APHa))] f (y, p,hp|x∗(APHa))dz≤∫
3
[
U
(
RI(APHb)−w · x∗(APHa))] f (y, p,hp|x∗(APHa))dz(15)
4. Condition 4:
SV ′(APHT )≥ 0(16)
Condition 1 states that for an input level lower (or more) than x∗s (the static optimal
level), the marginal utility of the input is always positive (or negative, respectively). This
condition means that the marginal utility of the input hits 0 only once, which ensures that
the x∗s indeed maximizes the concurrent utility globally. Condition 1 is less stringent than
simply assuming the marginal utility of the input is monotonically declining. For example,
the marginal utility can increase at first and then decline toward x∗s as long as µ(x) stays
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positive for x< x∗s .
Condition 2 states that the input is beneficial to crop yield up to the threshold x˜. Since
the input is non-damaging, the distribution of yield conditional on xb first-order stochasti-
cally dominates the distribution of yield conditional on xa when xa < xb as long as xb < x˜.
The marginal impact of additional input on the distribution is zero at the threshold, mean-
ing that the input no longer enhances yield and the conditional yield distribution stays the
same.
Condition 3 states that if one continues to use x∗(APHa) when APH increases to APHb
while all other values remain fixed, then the expected concurrent utility is going to be
greater. In order to understand why Condition 3 is likely to be satisfied for many producers,
we consider a risk-neutral producer as an illustration. Under the two levels of APH, the
respective expected profits conditional on x∗(APHa) are:
APHa : E
[
p · y+ I[APHa · τ> y] · pp · (APHa · τ− y)]− (1−σ(τ)) ·λYP(APHa)(17)
−w · x∗APHa−Cother
APHb : E
[
p · y+ I[APHb · τ> y] · pp · (APHb · τ− y)]− (1−σ(τ)) ·λYP(APHb)(18)
−w · x∗APHa−Cother
where σ(τ) is the subsidy rate, which is determined by the coverage rate (τ). Since APHa ·
τ< APHb ·τ, E[I[APHa ·τ> y]]< E[I[APHa ·τ> y]]. That is, the producer is more likely
to get an indemnity payment when APH = APHb. Also, APHa · τ− y < APHb · τ− y: the
size of the indemnity payment given y is greater when APH = APHb. Thus, the expected
indemnity payment is greater when APH = APHb. However, the premium payment is
greater because (1−σ(τ)) ·λYP(APHa)< (1−σ(τ)) ·λYP(APHb). Now, when we suppose
premium rates are calculated by RMA to be actuarially fair,
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E
[
I[APHa · τ> y] · pp · (APHa · τ− y)]= λYP(APHa)(19)
E
[
I[APHb · τ> y] · pp · (APHb · τ− y)]= λYP(APHb)(20)
For the expected profit to stay the same after changing APH from APHa to APHb, the
premium rate must increase by λYP(APHb)− λYP(APHa). However, due to the subsidy,
the actual increase in premium payment would be (1−σ(τ))(λYP(APHb)−λYP(APHa)),
which is always less than λYP(APHb)− λYP(APHa). For example, under the coverage
rate of 0.75, the subsidy rate is 0.55. Therefore, if an exogenous increase in APH were
to make a producer worse off, the premium rate must have been calculated so that the
premium rate is more than twice the expected indemnity payment in the first place. This
simple case illustrates why exogenous increase in APH is likely to enhance expected utility
because of premium subsidy. While the above argument cannot be used directly for risk-
averse producers, a similar argument still holds: subsidy on premium makes it likely that
an exogenous increase in APH makes producers better off.
Finally, Condition 4 simply states that an increase in APH (historical yield) does not
decrease the price at which the producer sells the land at the last period. Note that, by
design, the static problem is not able to consider the terminal value of land. This situation
means that the static model implicitly assumes SV (APHT ) = 0, and thus SV ′(APHT ) = 0.
It is important to keep in mind that the above theorem holds under the same assumption
SV ′(APHT ) = 0 (see Appendix A in the on-line supplementary appendix for the proof).
When SV ′(APHT ) > 0, the increase in input use under the dynamic model is even greater
because an increase in APH implies greater terminal-period benefits.
Now, at t = T , the Bellman equation of the dynamic problem is:
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V IT (APHT ) = maxxT
∫
3
[
U
(
RIT (APHT )−w · xT
)]
f (y, p,hp|xT )dz+SV (APHT )(21)
Then the FOC is
∫
3
U(RI(APHT )−w · xT ) · f ′(y, p|xT )dz+SV ′(APHT )−np ·
∫
3
∂U(pi)
∂pi
· f (y, p|xt)dz = 0
(22)
Now, if the producer does not consider the impact of APHT on the land value at the
final period, SV ′(APHT ) = 0, equation (22) becomes identical to the static FOC. This sit-
uation means that the optimal allocation obtained from the static approach is appropriate
to measure moral hazard only for those who intend to quit farming next year and does not
consider the impact of their yield history on their land value when they retire.
Numerical Examples: Nitrogen Use
In this section, we use the parameterization used in Babcock and Hennessy (1996) and con-
trast the optimal allocations and implied moral hazard in nitrogen use under crop insurance
in the static versus dynamic problem.
Model Parameters
We follow Babcock and Hennessy (1996) for the parameterization of the problems. Let
N denote the applied nitrogen rate (lb/acre). The distribution of corn yield conditional on
nitrogen rate (denoted h(y|N)) is assumed to be the same as that estimated for Site 11 in
Babcock and Hennessy (1996), which is used to obtain their main results.
15
h(y|N) = Γ[p(N)+q(N)]
Γ[p(N)]Γ[q(N)]
· (y−a)
P(N)−1(b− y)q(N)−1
bp(N)+q(N)−1
(23)
where p(N) = 3.14−0.0921
√
N+0.00603N, q(N) = 12.30−1.353
√
N+0.00456N, a=
48, and b= 202. Figure 4 shows how the mean and 5% and 95% quantiles of yield change
as one changes the nitrogen rate. This figure shows that the marginal impact of nitrogen
on yield is declining, consistent with agronomic theory. Figure 5 shows how the yield
distribution is modeled to respond to nitrogen rate (lb/acre); this figure shows that the yield
distribution is skewed towards the left at lower nitrogen rates, and then shifts to the right as
the producer applies more nitrogen.
In order to make the optimal nitrogen rates comparable between the static and dynamic
problems, the projected price stays constant, and the distribution of harvest price stays
the same through time in the dynamic problem. We use the projected price and the dis-
tribution of harvest price used in Babcock and Hennessy (1996). The projected price is
set at $2.20/bu. The distribution of harvest price follows a log normal distribution with
E[hp] = pp and Var(hp) = 0.45. We use a copula method to generate correlated yield and
harvest price, with the correlation coefficient of −0.3. Premium rates and payments are
calculated using the actuarial parameters for the 2016 production season in Sioux County,
Iowa. The impact of APH on the terminal value of land (selling price of the land in the end
period) is set to 0 (SV ′(APHT ) = 0). Since the static model is unable to capture the terminal
value of land, it implicitly assumes SV ′(APHT ) = 0. Thus, assuming SV ′(APHT ) = 0 in
the dynamic model allows us to attribute the difference in optimal nitrogen use between the
static and dynamic models purely to the dynamics introduced by the use of APH, which is
the objective of this article.
We consider three types of utility functions. Two of them are from Babcock and Hen-
16
nessy (1996): a risk neutral (RN) utility function and a constant absolute risk aversion
utility function with a risk parameter of 0.1 (CA). The third type is a constant relative risk
aversion utility function with a risk parameter of 0.6 (CR).8
In order to solve the dynamic model, the true equation of motion (τt+1 = (
9
∑
i=1
yt−i+
yt)/10) is approximated by the following formula, which is used also in Vercammen and
van Kooten (1994):
τt+1 =
9τt+ yt
10
(24)
This approximation reduces the time needed to solve the dynamic model with the true
equation of motion. Optimal nitrogen rate choice in a given time period requires the knowl-
edge of yields in the past nine years (yt−9, . . . ,yt−1). When one considers only 11 possible
yield values (say, 100 bu/acre to 200 bu/acre, with an increment of 10 bu/acre) for each of
the past nine years, one needs to find the optimal nitrogen rate for 119 = 2,357,947,691
combinations of yt−9, . . . ,yt−1 realizations in each time period. This process means that
even at the very coarse step of 10 bu/acre, it would not be feasible to complete simulations
in a reasonable amount of time, at least with the state of the computational power modern
machines possess. The approximate equation of motion dramatically decreases the number
of optimization problems to solve. Even with a step of 0.1 bu/acre, only 1001 optimization
problems are needed to be solved at each time period. Importantly, equation (24) approxi-
mates the true equation of motion reasonably well, though not perfectly (see Figure D.1 in
the on-line supplementary appendix, which depicts an example of APH trajectories derived
from the true and approximated equation of motion).
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Numerical Simulation
This article uses numerical methods to solve the static and dynamic optimization models
since analytical solutions are not obtainable due to the complexity of the models. For
the dynamic models, backward induction determines the optimal nitrogen rate path (see
Appendix A in the on-line supplementary appendix for more details). All the simulations
were performed using R software (R Core Team, 2016), and all the codes are available in
the on-line supplementary appendix. The Rcpp package (Eddelbuettel and Franc¸ois, 2011),
in particular, was extensively used to enhance computational speed.
Results
We first report results from the static and dynamic models independently, with a particular
focus on how APH affects optimal nitrogen rates. We then compare the static and dynamic
results when the APH is at the expected APH level at the steady state.
Static Model
Under the no-insurance scenario, the optimal nitrogen rates (lb/acre) are 198.0, 196.3, and
197.5 for the risk averseness types of RN, CA, and CR, respectively. These numbers are
generally very similar to those reported in tables 3 and 5 of Babcock and Hennessy (1996),
though our estimates are roughly 3 lb/acre smaller than their estimates–these differences
are likely due to the difference in numerical accuracy.9 Figure 6 shows the optimal nitrogen
rate conditional on APH under the three insurance types by risk averseness. The vertical
dotted lines represent the APH value of 136.5, the level used in Babcock and Hennessy
(1996). For all the cases we consider, the optimal nitrogen rate declines as APH increases.
As we saw in figure 5, nitrogen shifts the skewness of the yield distribution to the right.
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Since a higher APH means a greater ability for crop insurance to reduce downside yield
(revenue) risk, producers have less incentive to apply more nitrogen to shift the production
to the right; APH and nitrogen are complements. Interestingly, at higher coverage rates,
there exist thresholds of APH beyond which zero nitrogen is the optimal strategy. For
example, as shown in figure 6, at the coverage rate of 0.9, producers of CA utility type
would apply no nitrogen if APH is higher than 132 under RP. Consistent with economic
intuition, the APH threshold becomes lower as the coverage rate increases. While the APH
thresholds are similar between YP and RP−HPE, they are much lower under RP as it
possesses the greatest ability to insure revenue.
Dynamic Model
The solutions to the dynamic model are series of functions that map APH (APHt) on ni-
trogen rate (N∗t ) at each time period. Here, we focus on the optimal nitrogen level at the
steady state as this value is normally where producers make decisions. Specifically, we
discuss the optimal nitrogen rates at t = 20.10 Figure 7 shows the optimal nitrogen rate
choice (N∗t ) conditional on (APHt) at t = 20 by insurance type, coverage rate, and utility
type. They are similar to the static cases in that the optimal nitrogen rate declines as APH
increases. However, unlike the static cases, APH thresholds do not exist in any of the cases
considered.
Static vs. Dynamic
Table 2 presents optimal nitrogen rates under no insurance and the static and dynamic
optimal nitrogen rates by risk averseness, insurance type, and coverage rate when APH =
136.5. For the dynamic model, the expected optimal nitrogen rates at the steady state
(t = 20) are used for comparison; the optimal nitrogen rates at APH = 136.5 under YP, and
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RP-HPE that were obtained in this article are slightly smaller than those found in Babcock
and Hennessy (1996).
Under the static cases, moral hazard is most severe under RP, which was not consid-
ered in Babcock and Hennessy (1996). Since RP provides the most flexibility in protecting
revenue, unsurprisingly, the optimal nitrogen rates under RP are lower than under the other
two insurance plans at any combination of a coverage rate and utility type. For example,
under {τ= 0.85,U =CR, I = RP}, the optimal nitrogen rate is 172.7 lb/acre, which is 24.8
lb/acre less (12% reduction) than under the no-insurance scenario. If we were to draw
conclusions about moral hazard based on these results (with assumed APH of 136.5), we
would conclude that moral hazard is rather severe under RP, ranging from −20% to −30%
(except for the one case of 100% reduction under the utility function of CA and the cov-
erage rate of 0.9, which is not currently offered); alternatively, the moral hazard is modest
under YP and RP−HPE ranging from −10% to −20% depending on risk preferences. As
discussed earlier, these conclusions would be appropriate only for producers who intend
to quit farming next year, when no consideration is given to the signaling through a strong
yield history (APH) on the price of land.
Compared to the static case, optimal nitrogen levels in the dynamic cases are larger at
any combination of insurance type, coverage rate, and risk averseness. Figure 8 compares
the marginal value of nitrogen between the static and dynamic cases for {τ = 0.85,U =
RN, I = RP}. MR is the marginal expected revenue ∂E[RI(APHt)]/∂Nt and MVFt is the
cumulative expected marginal profit earned in the future periods ∂E[V It+1(0.9 ·APHt+0.1 ·
yt)]/∂Nt . The figure illustrates MVFt is a big part of the marginal value of nitrogen. Conse-
quently, ignoring MVFt can result in substantial underestimation of optimal nitrogen rates.
In many cases, differences between the static and dynamic cases are substantial. In
general, the divergence becomes larger as one moves fromYP to RP−HPE, then to RP and
also as the coverage rate goes up. At the extreme, for the case of {τ= 0.9,U =CA, I=RP},
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the dynamic case indicates only 3.3 lb/acre (1.7%) reduction in nitrogen rate, while the
static case suggests 100% reduction. For many other cases, the static results over-estimate
the degree of reduction in the nitrogen rate due to crop insurance. For example, for the
case of {τ = 0.85,U = CR, I = RP}, the static solution suggests about 13% reduction in
nitrogen rate, while the dynamic suggests a 1% reduction.
Interestingly, under the coverage rate of 0.7, the optimal nitrogen rates are actually
greater than under no insurance across all the insurance and utility types. This outcome
may explain why Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue (2006) observed statistically significant
increases in soybeans and wheat yields in North Dakota. In general, the above finding
illustrates the point that modeling the impact of insurance on optimal input allocation with-
out allowing for the impact of yield on APH can result in erroneous conclusions about the
direction of change in input use. This finding is important because it reveals that even if
an input can be regarded as a complement to crop insurance in the static case, producers
may use more inputs under crop insurance due to the way APH is used to calculate the
indemnity payment and premium rate.
Table 2 also reveals how insensitive the optimal nitrogen rates are to coverage rate and
the type of insurance. In the dynamic case the optimal nitrogen rate lies in the interval
[193.5,200.1], rather than in the [160.9,194.2] (excluding the 90% coverage rate) interval
of the static solution. In the dynamic approach the range of changes in nitrogen rate com-
pared to the no-insurance case for different coverage levels, insurance and utility types is
[−1.7%,+1.0%]. That is, moral hazard is almost non-existent and negligible for the par-
ticular case considered in this article. Vercammen and van Kooten (1994), using a dynamic
model, suggest that using APH may exacerbate moral hazard. At least for the parameteri-
zations used in this article, that situation does not appear to be true. Indeed, the use of APH
can help alleviate moral hazard. Thus, our findings are in line with Lambert (1983) and
Rogerson (1985) in that moral hazard can be lessened using the history of performances
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(yields) to modify the pay-off structure (indemnity and premium payment) for future insur-
ance schemes. Our findings are also consistent with the empirical findings in Roberts, Key,
and O’Donoghue (2006) that moral hazard is small.
Conclusion
The focus of this article is to examine the effect of actual production history on the moral
hazard created by crop insurance. APH is a crucial parameter that determines the ben-
efit of crop insurance by influencing the size and probability of the indemnity payment
and the value of the premium payment. Theoretically we show that when producers are
forward-looking, they use a greater amount of input when their current input decisions im-
pact current yield and thus future APH. We illustrate this result using the parametrization
in Babcock and Hennessy (1996), where we find higher optimal nitrogen rates when con-
sidering future opportunities– which is to say that we find a lower degree of moral hazard
associated with crop insurance than in their study.
We also find that at low coverage rates, the optimal application is higher than with-
out insurance, completely offsetting the incentive for moral hazard normally associated
with insurance. Under the different circumstances we explore in the dynamic context, we
find that the difference in optimal input use across these simulations are in the range of
[−1.7%,+1%], whereas we observe reductions of up to 100% in input use in simulations
run using static models with high APH. This difference suggests that the existing policy de-
sign that uses APH based on historical yields to adjust indemnity payments and premium
rates appears to minimize the moral hazard potentially created by crop insurance. Our re-
sults are consistent with Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue (2006), who found little evidence
of moral hazard as opposed to the conclusions in Vercammen and van Kooten (1994). Al-
locative and welfare impacts due to the moral hazard in the federal crop insurance program
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seem to be rather limited given the dynamic implications of APH.
While our results suggest APH plays a critical role in mitigating moral hazard, changes
in the calculation of APH may change this result. Recently, the RMA released new products
impacting the APH calculation: trend adjustment and yield exclusion, both with the poten-
tial to increase APH. Trend adjustment increases APH using the RMA-determined county
trend value. Yield exclusion allows producers to exclude actual yields from their APH
database when the current county average yield is below 50% of the ten-year county aver-
age. It would be of interest to study these products using simulated as well as econometric
models, and to focus on the degree of moral hazard brought about by these alternative de-
signs rather than just contrasting insured versus uninsured behavior, as most studies have
done (Horowitz and Lichtenberg, 1993; Quiggin, Karagiannis, and Stanton, 1993; Smith
and Goodwin, 1996; Roberts, Key, and O’Donoghue, 2006). Research on the allocative as
well as the welfare implications of these products is left for future research.
Our theoretical findings that under the specific conditions considered, optimal input
use when APH is exogenous is smaller to that when APH is endogenous applies gen-
erally. However, the degree of departure is conditional on the parametrization used in
the simulations–specifically, the distribution and parameters from Babcock and Hennessy
(1996). The reason for this choice was to illustrate how the degree of moral hazard due to
crop insurance is affected by APH in a dynamic decision model. It would be important to
investigate to what degree the difference in static versus dynamic input allocation depends
on the parametric choice. These pathways offer future research options for those interested
in the economic implications of the federal crop insurance program.
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Footnotes
1The Risk Management Agency (RMA) administers the Federal Crop Insurance Corpora-
tion (FCIC), which carries out the federal crop insurance program.
2Arrow (1963) was the first to look into the economic significance of moral hazard. Ar-
row (1985) proposed the term “hidden action” as a substitute for the term moral hazard. A
change in input use due to insurance that increases risk represents a “hidden action” by the
insured, and is categorized as moral hazard.
3While a 90% coverage rate does not exist, we analyze this coverage rate following Bab-
cock and Hennessy (1996) as an illustration.
4Note that p (the price producers receive for the grain) and hp (the price used to calculate
the indemnity payment) are different. The difference between the two is called basis.
5D includes commodity type, commodity year, state, county, insurance unit, and practice,
among other factors.
6Premium calculation is based on the on-line premium calculation tool by USDA-RMA
(https://ewebapp.rma.usda.gov/apps/costestimator/Estimates/QuickEstimate.
aspx). We took the formula from the tool and wrote an R program to calculate premium
payment under various APH levels, coverage rates, and insurance types. The reference
yield and other actuarial parameters used to calculate the premium rates and payments pre-
sented in figures 2 and 3 are for the 2016 rainfed corn production for Sioux County, Iowa.
We picked Sioux County here because we use a production function estimated in Babcock
and Henessy (1996) using data generated via field trial in Sioux County.
7The technical term for “terminal” value is salvage (or scrap) value in dynamic optimiza-
tion.
8We do not present the results with constant absolute risk aversion with the risk parameter
of 0.06 from Babcock and Hennessy (1996) because they are similar in nature to those with
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CR.
9The advancements in computational power allowed us to run 50,000 iterations as opposed
to 1,000 in Babcock and Hennessy (1996).
10Figure D.2 shows the path of expected nitrogen rates by insurance type when the cover-
age rate is 85% and the starting APH is 136.5. As one can see, the expected nitrogen rate
soon reaches the steady state when the expected nitrogen rate is stabilized around 195 and
200. For other cases, a similar pattern manifests. Indeed, the optimal nitrogen rates are
almost identical from t = 5 through t = 30. We picked the optimal nitrogen levels at t = 20
to serve the optimal nitrogen levels at the steady state.
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Table 1: Subsidy Schedule
Coverage rate 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85
Subsidy rate 0.67 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.59 0.55 0.48 0.38
Note: This table presents subsidy rates for each coverage rates.
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Table 2: Comparison of Static and Dynamic Optimal Nitrogen Rates by Coverage
Rate, Risk Averseness, and Insurance Type
No Insurance (YPs, YPd) (RPHPEs, RPHPEd) (RPs, RPd)
Risk Neutral
70% (194.4,200.1) (194.2,200.0) (191.8,199.6)
85% 198.0 (183.5,197.9) (183.1,197.6) (175.7,196.2)
90% (177.7,196.9) (176.6,196.7) (166.7,195.2)
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (0.0100)
70% (188.2,197.7) (186.7,197.4) (182.9,196.7)
85% 196.3 (171.9,194.9) (169.5,194.8) (160.9,193.5)
90% (164.9,193.9) (160.3,194.3) (0,193)
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (0.6)
70% (193.0,199.5) (192.5,199.4) (189.8,198.9)
85% 197.5 (181.0,197.2) (180.3,196.9) (172.7,195.5)
90% (174.9,196.2) (173.3,196.2) (163.0,194.7)
Note: This table presents the optimal nitrogen use for the static and dynamic models from our
numerical simulations. Optimal nitrogen uses are reported for various combinations of insurance
types, coverage rates, and utility types. YP refers to yield protection, RP-HPE refers to revenue
protection with harvest price exclusion, and RP refers to revenue protection. Subscripts s (d) for
crop insurance types indicate the model considered is static (dynamic).
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Figure 1: Regions where indemnity payments are triggered by insurance type
Note: This figure illustrates the parameter space of harvest price (hp) and realized yield (y) that would trigger
indemnity payment at yield protection (YP), revenue protection with harvest price exclusion (RP-HPE), and
revenue protection (RP) when the APH is 150, the projected price (pp) is $2.20 bu/acre, and the coverage rate
is 80%. Harvest price was limited from $1 to $4, as the range is sufficient to illustrate the differences among
the insurance types. Under YP, if the realized yield is less than 120 (150∗0.8) (i.e., is left of the vertical line
at 120), then indemnity triggered irrespective of the harvest price. Under RP-HPE, indemnity is triggered if
hp · y ≤ pp · 120 (i.s., below the convex line). The non-linear line that delineates the upper bound of region
A and C is hp = pp · 120/y. Finally, under RP, indemnity is triggered if hp · y ≤ max{hp, pp} · 120, which
covers all A, B, and C.
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Figure 2: Subsidized premium rate against APH by coverage rate
Note: These panels show how subsidized premium rates change as APH goes up for coverage rates of 60%,
70%, 80%, and 85% under each ofYP, RP-HPE, and RP insurance types. Reference yield and other actuarial
parameters are for the 2016 production season in Sioux County, Iowa. Rate yield was set to be the same as
APH.
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Figure 3: Subsidized premium ($/acre) against APH by coverage rate
Note: These panels show how subsidized premium payments change as APH goes up for coverage rates of
60%, 70%, 80%, and 85% under each of YP, RP-HPE, and RP insurance types. Reference yield and other
actuarial parameters are for the 2016 production season in Sioux County, Iowa. Rate yield was set to be the
same as APH.
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Figure 4: Modeled yield response to nitrogen
Note: This figure shows how yield (bu/acre) is modeled to respond to nitrogen rate (lb/acre) based on
equation (23) in the numerical example. The black solid line represents the mean yield conditional on nitrogen
rate. The lower and upper ends of the shaded region are the 10% and 90% quantiles of yield conditional on
nitrogen rate.
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Figure 5: The distribution of modeled yield at select nitrogen rates
Note: This figure shows how the yield distribution is modeled to respond to nitrogen rate (lb/acre) based on
equation (23) in the numerical example. At lower range of nitrogen rates, the yield distribution is skewed
towards the left. As the nitrogen rate increases, the distribution shifts to the right.
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Figure 6: Optimal N choice conditional on APH for various combinations of coverage
rates, insurance types, and utility types
Note: These panels show the optimal nitrogen rates (y-axis) of static models under various levels of APH
(x-axis) by coverage rate (0.7, 0.85, and 0.9), insurance type (YP, RP-HPE, and RP), and utility type (RN,
CA, and CR). Presented numbers are based on the numerical simulations. In general, the optimal nitrogen
rate goes down as APH goes up for any combination of coverage rate, insurance type, and utility type. In
some cases, optimal nitrogen rate fall sharply to zero when APH passes the threshold.
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Figure 7: Optimal N choice conditional on APH at the steady state (t = 20) for various
combinations of coverage rates, insurance types, and utility types
Note: This figure shows how the optimal nitrogen rates (y-axis) at the steady state differ based on APH (x–
axis) by coverage rate (0.7, 0.85, and 0.9), insurance type (YP, RP-HPE, and RP), and utility type (RN, CA,
and CR). Presented numbers are based on the numerical simulations. In all cases, optimal nitrogen rates at
the steady state go down as APH goes up. Unlike the static case, APH thresholds do not exist.
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Figure 8: Comparison of marginal benefits of N between the static and dynamic cases
Note: This figure shows how the marginal expected value of nitrogen differ between the static and dynamic
case for the coverage rate of 0.85 and utility type of RN (risk neutral) at t = 20. Presented values are based on
the numerical simulations. In the static case, the marginal value of nitrogen is simply the marginal increase
in revenue in the current period. In the dynamic case, the marginal value of nitrogen consists of marginal
increases in revenue in the current period and marginal increases in the profit in the future periods. Nitrogen
price is also presented in the figure. The optimal nitrogen rate is where the marginal value of nitrogen curves
intersect with the the flat nitrogen price line. Here, the marginal value of nitrogen is always greater in the
dynamic case compared to the static case. Hence, the larger optimal nitrogen rate.
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